38 Years ago today: On 23 January 1982 a World Airways DC-10 overran the Boston-Logan Airport, MA runway into the water; killing 2 out of 212 occupants.
|Date:||Saturday 23 January 1982|
McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30CF
|C/n / msn:||47821/320|
|Total airframe hrs:||6327|
|Engines:||3 General Electric CF6-50C2|
|Crew:||Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 12|
|Passengers:||Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 200|
|Total:||Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 212|
|Aircraft fate:||Written off (damaged beyond repair)|
|Location:||Boston-Logan International Airport, MA (BOS) ( United States of America)|
|Crash site elevation:||6 m (20 feet) amsl|
|Nature:||Domestic Scheduled Passenger|
|Departure airport:||Newark International Airport, NJ (EWR/KEWR), United States of America|
|Destination airport:||Boston-Logan International Airport, MA (BOS/KBOS), United States of America|
The DC-10 made a non-precision instrument approach to runway 15R and touched down 2800 feet past the displaced threshold. When the crew sensed that the aircraft couldn’t be stopped on the remaining runway, they steered the DC-10 off the side of the runway to avoid the approach light pier, and slid into the shallow water. The nose section separated as the DC-10 came to rest 250 feet past the runway end, 110 feet left of the extended centreline.
PROBABLE CAUSE: “The minimal braking effectiveness on the ice-covered runway; the failure of the Boston-Logan International Airport management to exercise maximum efforts to assess the condition of the runway to assure continued safety of landing operations; the failure of air traffic control to transmit the most recent pilot reports of braking action to the pilot of Flight 30H; and the captain’s decision to accept and maintain an excessive airspeed derived from the auto throttle speed control system during the landing approach which caused the aircraft to land about 2,800 feet beyond the runway’s displaced threshold.
Contributing to the accident were the inadequacy of the present system of reports to convey reliable braking effectiveness information and the absence of provisions in the Federal Aviation Regulations to require: (1) airport management to measure the slipperiness of the runways using standardised procedures and to use standardised criteria in evaluating and reporting braking effectiveness and in making decisions to close runways. (2) operators to provide flight crews and other personnel with information necessary to correlate braking effectiveness on contaminated runways with aircraft stopping distances, and (3) extended minimum runway lengths for landing on runways which adequately take into consideration the reduction of braking effectiveness due to ice and snow. “