ARFF Daily News
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Today is Friday the 25th of April, 2025
We close out the week with these stories...
Have a safe weekend!
Tom
Medical helicopter crashes in Hartford, Illinois; all crew members taken to hospital
The ARCH aircraft crashed across from the fire department.
Author: Jonathan Fong
HARTFORD, Illinois — A medical helicopter crashed Thursday night in Hartford, Illinois, about 30 minutes north of St. Louis. All three crew members on board made it out of the crash.
The ARCH Air Medical helicopter crashed across the street from the Hartford Fire Department, on a vacant lot at North Delmar Avenue and Date Street.
According to FAA data shown on the flight tracking website FlightAware, the helicopter was based at ARCH's Granite City base, which is where it took off from earlier Thursday night en route to Hartford.
A spokesperson from ARCH's parent company Air Methods said "at around 9 p.m., the ARCH 1 crew from Granite City, IL, was involved in an incident as they were departing from a local fire station. All three crew members on board have been transported to local hospitals for evaluation. We continue to support our teammates and are working with the authorities in support of the investigation." The spokesperson did not mention if any crew members were physically hurt.
A social media post from the Hartford Fire Department at around 6:30 p.m. said "the department will be hosting ARCH Medical this evening for training. They will be landing a helicopter this evening in the empty lot across Date Street. Please do not be alarmed, this is for training purposes only."
On social media, state Rep. Amy Elik, R-Alton, said "we are aware of the terrible helicopter crash in Hartford and ask for your prayers for those injured tonight. This is a terrifying situation and we are still learning details."

Six die as plane crashes into sea near Hua Hin
Police aircraft on test flight after undergoing maintenance in preparation for parachute training exercise
WRITER: Wassayos Ngamkham and Chaiwat Satyaem
A small police aircraft crashed into the sea near Hua Hin airport on Friday morning, resulting in the deaths of all six officers onboard.
The 191 Emergency Centre reported the accident at 8.15am, stating that the aircraft went down in the Gulf of Thailand about 100 metres offshore from the Baby Grand Hua Hin Hotel.
The beachside resort is located in Cha-am district of Phetchburi, just one kilometre north of Hua Hin airport and about eight kilometres from Hua Hin town in Prachuap Khiri Khan province.
Onboard the DHC-6-400 Twin Otter aircraft were three pilots, two mechanics and an aircraft engineer.
The aircraft was on a test flight in preparation for a parachute training drill in Hua Hin, said Pol Lt Gen Archayon Kraithong, spokesman for the Royal Thai Police.
Five officers died at the scene: pilots Pol Col Prathan Khiewkham and Pol Lt Col Panthep Maneewachirangkul, along with aircraft engineer Pol Lt Thanawat Mekprasert and mechanics Pol L/Cpl Jeerawat Maksakha and Pol Sgt Maj Prawat Pholhongsa.
Another seriously injured pilot, Pol Capt Chaturong Wattanapaisarn, was rushed to Hua Hin Hospital where he succumbed to his injuries at about 4pm on Friday.
National police chief Kittharath Punpetch on Friday inspected the crash site and also visited Pol Capt Chaturong in hospital before he passed away.
The plane, one of three Twin Otters acquired by the Royal Thai Police in 2020, had recently undergone maintenance, according to local media reports.
An initial investigation showed that the aircraft lost stability shortly after leaving the runway. Video taken from shore showed the plane ascending and then going into a vertical nosedive.
Despite pilots’ attempts to regain control, it plunged into the sea, with the fuselage appearing to break in two upon impact.
An investigation is under way to determine the cause of the crash.


Small plane goes off runway and crashes into fence at Fullerton Airport
FULLERTON, Calif. (KABC) -- A small plane made a crash landing on the runway at Fullerton Municipal Airport on Thursday.
The single-engine plane with two people aboard was unable to stop before the end of the runway and crashed into a fence.
No injuries were reported, and the cause of the crash is under investigation.
This is the latest incident at Fullerton Airport, which has reported six crashes since 2020, including one in January that killed two people and injured 19 others.
https://abc7.com/post/small-plane-goes-off-runway-crashes-fence-fullerton-municipal-airport-orange-county/16244791/

NTSB Prelim: Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC 135 P2+
The Goggle Case Rolled Off His Lap To The Left And He Reached For It. As He Did, The Helicopter Pitched Violently Forward
Location: Hampstead, NC Accident Number: ERA25LA126
Date & Time: February 24, 2025, 19:45 Local Registration: N930NH
Aircraft: Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC 135 P2+ Injuries: 3 Serious
Flight Conducted Under: Part 135: Air taxi & commuter - Non-scheduled - Air Medical (Discretionary)
On February 24, 2025, about 1945 eastern standard time, a Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC 135P2+, N930NH, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Hampstead, North Carolina. The pilot, flight paramedic, and flight nurse were seriously injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135, positioning flight.
The helicopter, callsign "AirLink1" (AL1), was operated by Integra Aviation LLC. dba Apollo MedFlight for Novant Health’s AirLink air ambulance program which provided air medical services in both North and South Carolina.
The flight, destined for Albert J Ellis Airport (OAJ), Jacksonville, North Carolina, departed NHRMC-Ed North Heliport (45NR), Wilmington, North Carolina about 1938 after off-loading a patient from an interfacility transfer flight, and refueling. According to preliminary air traffic control (ATC) information, after liftoff, AL1 contacted the control tower at Wilmington International Airport (ILM), Wilmington, North Carolina about 1939. Local Control (LC) acknowledged and AL1 stated that they were off 45NR landing OAJ. LC acknowledged and instructed AL1 to remain south of runway 24 and ident. LC advised AL1; they had radar contact 3 miles southwest of ILM. LC then advised AL1 again that they had radar contact 3 miles southwest of ILM at 600 feet. AL1 acknowledged the altitude. LC then instructed AL1, visual flight rules (VFR) at pilot's discretion. AL1 acknowledged and advised LC they were climbing up to 1,000 feet. LC acknowledged.
At 1940, LC cleared AL1 on course with a restriction to remain east of runway 17. AL1 acknowledged. At 1943, LC instructed AL1to contact Wilmington Approach (WAP) on frequency 135.75. AL l acknowledged. AL1 then checked in with WAP. WAP acknowledged and cleared AL1 on course. AL1 acknowledged.
At 1944, WAP requested AL1report altitude.
At 1945, WAP called LC. WAP and LC discussed the possibility that AL1 was in coast track and might have gone down. WAP called AL1 with no response. LC called AL1 with no response. LC again called AL1 with no response or ident. LC then contacted a company helicopter, callsign “AirLink 2” (AL2) and asked if they had communication with AL1. AL2 stated they would call AL1.
At 1946, WAP called AL1 with no response. LC and AL2 discussed the situation and WAP called LC to discuss AL2 searching for AL1. LC acknowledged. WAP then asked other aircraft to look for AL1 and supplied a position. They advised no contact. WAP acknowledged. LC then called AL1 once again with no response.
Aircraft in the area, as well as state and local authorities were then contacted with the last contact information, flight route information, and possible location information. According to the pilot, after refueling, he lifted off and headed out of the New Haven Regional Medical Center towards the northeast, staying on the east side of runway 17/35 at ILM as instructed by ATC and stayed below 600 feet to avoid a conflict with departing traffic. Once clear of the airport traffic area, he climbed to 1,000 feet enroute back to their base at OAJ. He had the autopilot on and was wearing his night vision goggles (NVGs). Shortly after reaching 1,000 feet, the NVGs with the mount came off the visor of his helmet and were hanging by the battery pack cord. He then disconnected the NVGs from the battery pack and had them in his lap. He then reached over his head, grabbed the strap for the night vision goggle case that was hanging on the backside of the pilot's seat. He pulled that over his head (or around the side) and opened the NVG storage bag and put the goggles and the battery pack along with the mount in the case. He could not remember if he zipped the case closed or not, but at some point, the goggle case rolled off his lap to the left and he reached for it. As he did, the helicopter pitched violently forward and started a descent.
The pilot then tried to regain control of the helicopter, and remembered the helicopter entering the trees, then at some point, his memory went blank. He stated that his next memory was of him standing next to the helicopter. He could not remember how he got out of the helicopter but remembered standing next to it. He also remembered the flight nurse and him working to free the flight paramedic who was trapped in the front left seat of the helicopter (the helicopter was on its left side). He also remembered pulling the instrument console off the flight paramedic while the flight nurse pulled the flight paramedic free. They next moved the flight paramedic to a nearby tree, where the three of them sat down and collected their thoughts about what happened and to rest. The pilot had his cell phone on him at the time, and was able to make a call, and send a ping of where their present position was so they could be rescued.
According to the flight paramedic, they had reached an altitude of 1,000 feet and the pilot engaged the autopilot. The flight was uneventful until the pilot’s NVGs fell off. He offered to help him put them back on. He could not remember what exactly the pilot said to him, but it was similar to, "I am going to just take them off because we are not taking another flight."
The pilot then took the night vision goggles off his helmet and put them in his case, which he had in front of him. The flight paramedic could not completely recall but that is when the helicopter went into a nosedive. The pilot pulled them out of the nosedive and the flight paramedic remembered that it was incredibly dark. He did not see anything for the first couple of seconds. Then he remembered seeing trees and then going into the trees. The pilot said, "hold on guys" and he felt the nose of the aircraft go up like the pilot was flaring to cushion the impact. He covered his face with his arms and remembered feeling every impact with the trees. He also remembered feeling them hit the ground and the dash coming down on his legs, and mud and water hitting him on the face and then everything stopped.
According to the flight nurse, she was sitting on the pilot side aft facing seat. They lifted off. All their seat belts were on.
The pilot had done the preflight check list. All things were normal, and there were no caution lights. The pilot had communicated to flight operations that they were approximately 25 minutes from their base at OAJ. As they were flying back to base the pilot was communicating with ATC. She then heard a conversation between the pilot and the flight paramedic concerning the NVG mount falling off the pilot’s helmet. The flight paramedic then asked the pilot if he would like him to fix his goggles and the pilot replied, "I am all set." "I will put them back in the bag." Right after the conversation, there was a huge loss of altitude. She asked the pilot what just happened, and he asked her if she was ok back there, and she said, "our stuff is everywhere back here, but I am fine." There was a moment when she felt everything would be okay. She was still belted in and surveying what was happening. She then heard a scraping noise, and the pilot said, "guys hang on." She remembered them going through trees, dirt and water was flying, and there was lots of noise. When they came to rest, the helicopter was on its left side, and she was hanging from her seatbelt. She then popped her seatbelt off and dropped into the water, then after a short delay was able to egress.
Once she got out, the first thing she did was ask the flight paramedic for his cell phone and he said he did not have his. She then asked the pilot for his cell phone, and he pulled it out of his pocket and handed it to her. She went to his call list and found a name she knew. She then called the individual and told him they had been in a crash, they were alive, the pilot had a broken leg, and the flight paramedic’s leg was also broken, and he was trapped. The individual had a radio and called flight operations and communicated that they were all alive.
While they were waiting for rescue, she asked the pilot what happened. He replied, "I dropped the NVG bag on the collective." The pilot then apologized, and both she and the flight paramedic said it was ok and that neither of them was mad at him. They later were rescued, and the flight paramedic was freed from the wreckage by the flight nurse and flight paramedic from AL2, some hunters, and two North Carolina State Highway Patrol troopers.
According to FAA, and company records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, rotorcraft-helicopter, and instrument airplane and helicopter. He had accrued approximately 2,080 total flight hours, of which 1,556 hours were in rotorcraft, 24 hours was in the make and model of helicopter, 365 hours was at night, 290 hours were in actual instrument conditions, and 158 hours were in simulated instrument conditions. His most recent FAA first class medical certificate was issued on June 10, 2024.
According to FAA and helicopter maintenance records, the helicopter was manufactured in 2006. The helicopter’s most recent continuous airworthiness inspection was completed on February 4, 2025. At the time of the inspection, the helicopter had accrued approximately 12,179.2 total hours of operation.
The recorded weather at ILM, at 1953, approximately 5 minutes after the accident, included: calm wind, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 7° C, dew point 4° C, and an altimeter setting of 30.02 inches of mercury.
Sunset occurred at 1804 and the end of civil twilight occurred at 1829. Around the time of the accident, the Sun was more than 22° below the horizon and the Moon was more than 62° below the horizon. Dark nighttime conditions prevailed.
The wreckage was retained for examination.
FMI: www.ntsb.gov

Today in History
45 Years ago today: On 25 April 1980 Dan-Air Services flight 1008, a Boeing 727, impacted a mountain while on approach to Tenerife-Norte Los Rodeos Airport, Spain, killing all 146 occupants.
Date: Friday 25 April 1980
Time: 13:21
Type: Boeing 727-46
Owner/operator: Dan-Air Services
Registration: G-BDAN
MSN: 19279/288
Year of manufacture: 1966
Total airframe hrs: 30622 hours
Engine model: P&W JT8D-7
Fatalities: Fatalities: 146 / Occupants: 146
Other fatalities: 0
Aircraft damage: Destroyed, written off
Category: Accident
Location: Esperanzo Forest - Spain
Phase: Approach
Nature: Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi
Departure airport: Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC)
Destination airport: Tenerife-Norte Los Rodeos Airport (TFN/GCXO)
Investigating agency: AIB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
Dan-Air Services flight 1008, a Boeing 727, impacted a mountain while on approach to Tenerife-Norte Los Rodeos Airport, Spain, killing all 146 occupants.
Dlight DA1008 took off from Manchester Airport (MAN) at 09:22 UTC en route for Tenerife-Norte Los Rodeos Airport (TFN). After an uneventful flight, the crew contacted Tenerife North Airport Approach Control at 13:14, informing them that they were at FL110 and at 14 nautical miles from the TFN VOR/DME. Approach Control replied, "Dan Air one zero zero eight, cleared to the Foxtrot Papa beacon via Tango Foxtrot November, flight level one one zero expect runway one two, no delay." The Dan Air crew repeated the clearance and requested meteorological information, which was given as: "OK runway in use one two, the wind one two zero zero five, visibility six from seven kilometres clouds, two oktas at one two zero metres, plus four oktas at two five zero metres, plus two oktas at three five zero metres, November Hotel one zero three, temperature one six, dew point one, and drizzle." Approximately one minute later Approach Control told the aircraft to descend and maintain FL60. Receipt of this message was acknowledged by the aircraft, whereupon the controller immediately requested it to indicate its distance from the TFN beacon. The crew replied that it was at 7 NM from TFN.
At 13:18:48 UTC the aircraft notified Approach Control that it had just passed TFN and that it was heading for the 'FP' beacon. The controller then informed them of an unpublished hold over Foxtrot Papa: "Roger, the standard holding over Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly." Dan Air 1008 only replied "Roger" without repeating the information received, which was not compulsory under the ICAO regulations in force at the time of the accident. Almost one minute later, the aircraft the crew reported: "Dan Air one zero zero eight, Foxtrot Papa level at six zero, taking up the hold" and Tenerife APP replied: "Roger". Instead of passing overhead FP, the flight had passed this navaid at 1.59 NM to the South. Instead of entering the 255 radial, the Boeing 727 continued its trajectory in the direction of 263 degrees for a duration of more than 20 seconds, entering an area with a minimum safety altitude (MSA) of 14500 ft. The co-pilot at that point said: "Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" The captain remarked "Yes, doesn't isn't parallel with the runway or anything." The flight engineer then also made some remarks about the holding procedure. Approach control then cleared them down to 5000 feet.
The captain then remarked: "Hey did he say it was one five zero inbound?". It appears that at this moment the information received on the holding flashed back to the Captain's mind, making him realize that his manoeuvre was taking him to magnetic course 150 degrees outbound from 'FP', whereas the information received was "inbound" on the holding, heading 150 degrees towards 'FP'. The copilot responded: "Inbound yeh". "I don't like that", the captain said. The GPWS alarm sounded. The captain interrupted his left hand turn and entered a right hand turn and ordered an overshoot. They overflew a valley, temporarily deactivating the GPWS warning. The copilot suggested: "I suggest a heading of one two two actually and er take us through the overshoot, ah." But the captain continued with the turn to the right, because he was convinced that the turn he had been making to the left was taking him to the mountains. The captain contacted Approach Control at 13:21: "Er ... Dan Air one zero zero eight, we've had a ground proximity Warning." About two seconds later the aircraft flew into the side of a mountain at an altitude of approximately 5450 ft (1662 m) and at 11.5 km off course.
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The captain, without taking into account the altitude at which he was flying, took the aircraft into an area of very high ground, and for this reason he did not maintain the correct safety distance above the ground, as was his obligation.
Contributing factors were:
a) the performance of a manoeuvre without having clearly defined it;
b) imprecise navigation on the part of the captain, showing his loss of bearings;
c) lack of teamwork between captain and co-pilot;
d) the short space of time between the information given and the arrival at 'FP';
e) the fact that the holding was not published" (Spanish report)
UK authorities agreed in general with the report, but added some comments to give the report 'a proper balance':
1. The information concerning the holding pattern at FP, which was transmitted by ATC, was ambiguous and contributed directly to the disorientation of the crew.
2. No minimum safe altitude computed for holding pattern.
3. Track for holding pattern at 'FP' is unrealistic.
