ARFF Daily News

Wednesday the 5th of February, 2025

NTSB releases Learjet 55 crash photographs

By Jon Hemmerdinger

Photographs released by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) show the extent of ground damaged caused by last week’s deadly crash of a Bombardier Learjet 55, and the state of the jet’s recovered cockpit-voice recorder.

The investigatory agency on 4 February released the images, one of which shows investigators standing on the edge of a crater created when the air ambulance slammed into pavement at high speed.

Another photograph shows the Learjet 55’s smashed cockpit voice recorder, which the NTSB has said it recovered from 8ft below ground level.

The jet took off at about 18:06 local time on 31 January from Northeast Philadelphia airport and climbed to about 1,500ft before making a “steep decent” into the ground, NTSB investigator Ralph Hicks said on 1 February.

Video posted on social media purportedly shows the jet descending at a steep angle and at high speed before crashing with a large explosion.

The aircraft crashed into a “commercial and residential area”, killing six people aboard, said NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy. The six people on the jet have been reported as four crew, a patient and a relative.

One person on the ground was also killed.

“This was a high-impact crash and the plane is highly fragmented,” said Homendy. “The debris field extends four or five blocks.”

The flight was headed to Springfield-Branson National airport in Missouri.

The aircraft had been operated by Med Jets USA, doing business as Mexico-based Jet Rescue, Homendy added.

https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/ntsb-releases-learjet-55-crash-photographs/161667.article

Unlatched Door Suspected In RV-10 Fatal Accident

Multiple pilot witnesses report seeing evidence of unsecured door on takeoff.

Mark Phelps

The National Transportation Safety Board Preliminary Report (posted below) on the Jan. 2 crash of a Vans RV-10 in Fullerton, California, confirms earlier reports that multiple witnesses observed the pilot’s side clamshell door swinging open on takeoff. The report further reveals that Vans sent the builder-owner a retrofit kit for a secondary door latch in January 2010, but the latch was never installed.

The builder-owner received the kit components for the full aircraft between 2007 and 2008, completing construction in 2011. According to the NTSB, installing the secondary latch kit “was recommended before further flight as described in Service Bulletin 10-1-4, published by Vans Aircraft on January 4, 2010.”

The accident flight departed from Fullerton Airport (KFUL) around 2 p.m. local time. While the aircraft was in the runup area, security video shows the door was in the down position, but not flush with the fuselage. A witness near the departure end of the departure Runway 24 reported seeing the aircraft pass right to left, and saw the door swing open at approximately 100 feet above ground level. He then saw an arm reach up and pull the door down.

Shortly after, the pilot transmitted “immediate landing required,” initially saying he would land in the opposite direction on Runway 6. But he then entered a left downwind for Runway 24. The four-seat aircraft crashed into the roof of a furniture warehouse on the base leg, killing the pilot and his passenger (his teenage daughter) and injuring 20 workers in the warehouse. Multiple pilot witnesses reported they saw a “panel-like” white piece fall from the aircraft—adding that it “floated” or “fluttered” to the roof of the warehouse, coming to rest largely intact about 150 feet short of the main impact site.

According to the NTSB report, “The door handle was found just short of the forward closed and locked position, and because it was not fully forward, its locking button had not engaged. The lock pins were found extended about 1/2 inch out of the door ends, and when the door handle was tested by moving it forward, the pins extended a further 7/16 inch and the locking button engaged.”

The builder-owner had also modified the door-unsafe warning system. The NTSB Preliminary Report included: “On the accident airplane, it appeared that only two [of four] reed switches had been installed, with each mounted to the aft pillars of both doors. As such, the modified system would not have warned the pilot if the forward latch pins had failed to fully engage.”

https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/rv10-accident-aircraft-lacked-recommended-safety-latch/?MailingID=FLY250204032&utm_campaign=avwebflash&utm_medium=newsletter&oly_enc_id=3681J3205156A2X

NTSB Final Report: Quad City Challenger

Pilot Stated He Had No Experience In The Airplane Make And Model, But That He Ferried Airplanes For A Living

Location: Kent, Washington Accident Number: WPR23LA086
Date & Time: January 7, 2023, 13:18 Local Registration: N528J
Aircraft: Quad City Challenger Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Loss of control in flight Injuries: 2 Serious
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Positioning

Analysis: The pilot-rated passenger had just purchased the light sport airplane and hired the pilot to relocate airplane to his home airport. The passenger/owner reported that the pilot stated he had no experience in the airplane make and model, but that he ferried airplanes for a living and was confident with no hesitations. After conducting a preflight inspection, the pilot and passenger boarded the airplane and the passenger briefed the pilot on the use of the airplane’s flaperons. The passenger reported that the airplane “swerved right” about 20 ft above ground level after takeoff, and that the pilot continued the climb while adjusting the flaperons. The pilot reported that, shortly after takeoff, the airplane became “unresponsive” to left stick inputs and entered an uncontrolled turn to the right. The pilot was unable to recover, and the airplane descended and impacted the roof of a storage facility, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. 

The forward control stick aileron cables separated at the left aileron turnbuckle and right aileron cable near the forward pulley. The forward control stick aileron cable sections, including turnbuckles and forward pulleys, were removed for further examination. The flaperons were near the full-down position. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The right aileron control cable and the turnbuckle barrel for the left aileron control cable both exhibited ductile overstress fractures from abnormal loading, likely associated with impact. Even if either of the fractures occurred before impact, the ailerons could have been controlled by cables attached to the aft control stick. 

The left pulley and support brackets showed multiple contact marks and scratches consistent with cable contact outside the normal pulley groove contact area, but no similar contact marks were observed on the right pulley. If the abnormal cable marks on the left pulley were the result of slack in the system before the fracture, similar marks would also be expected on the right pulley. The absence of abnormal cable contact marks on the right pulley suggests the marks on the left pulley assembly likely occurred due to impact rather than due to preexisting slack in the system. 

Information from the airplane manufacturer stated that pilots should not attempt to fly without a proper type checkout. Information on the use of the flaperon system indicated that, under certain flight conditions with the flaperons extended, control stick pressures would become “heavy,” and in some cases, “an increasingly steep dive will result.” 

The pilot reported no experience in the accident airplane make and model. It is likely that the pilot’s lack of familiarity with the airplane’s flight characteristics resulted in his loss of airplane control during flight. 

Probable Cause and Findings: The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be -- The pilot’s inflight loss of airplane control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s decision to fly the airplane without receiving training in its operation and flight characteristics.

FMI: www.ntsb.gov