ARFF Daily News

Monday the 20th of January, 2025 - Martin Luther King Day

Experimental plane ends up on its roof after crashing near North Perry Airport; pilot stable

By Rubén Rosario

PEMBROKE PINES, FLA. (WSVN) - A plane problem in Pembroke Pines landed a pilot in the hospital.

A small aircraft ended up on its roof about a quarter of a mile from North Perry Airport, at around 2:20 p.m., Sunday.

According to the Federal Aviation Administration, the single-engine Montaer MC-01 experimental aircraft lost power after takeoff and crashed.

Pembroke Pines Fire Rescue officials said the pilot was the only person on board and managed to exit the aircraft.

The pilot was transported to Memorial Regional Hospital with minor injuries and is listed in stable condition.

Back at the scene, firefighters cleaned up a small fuel leak.

The FAA and the National Transportation Safety Board are investigating the crash.

https://wsvn.com/news/local/broward/experimental-plane-ends-up-on-its-roof-after-crashing-near-north-perry-airport-pilot-stable/

NTSB Final Report: Rutan Longez

While Climbing To Cruise Altitude After Takeoff, The Engine Suddenly Lost Total Power

Location: Genoa Township, Michigan Accident Number: CEN23LA371
Date & Time: August 19, 2023, 08:20 Local Registration: N29TM
Aircraft: Rutan Longez Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Loss of engine power (total) Injuries: 1 Minor
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

Analysis: The pilot reported that, while climbing to cruise altitude after takeoff, the engine suddenly lost total power. He attempted to restart the engine, but was unsuccessful, and subsequently conducted a forced landing into a pond. While maneuvering, the airplane impacted a tree, resulting in substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage.

Examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The magnetos had evidence of exposure to high temperature; however, both magnetos functioned when bench tested. Blast tubes for magneto cooling were installed, but the effectiveness of the blast tubes could not be determined. The reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined. 

Probable Cause and Findings: The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be -- A total loss of engine power for undetermined reasons.

FMI: www.ntsb.gov

NTSB Prelim: Vans RV-7A

Unable To Make It To E63, The Pilot Initiated A Forced Landing To A Field With Tall Desert Vegetation

Location: Gila Bend, AZ Accident Number: WPR25LA070
Date & Time: December 22, 2024, 16:39 Local Registration: N1FB
Aircraft: Vans RV-7A Injuries: 1 Minor, 1 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

On December 22, 2024, about 1639 mountain standard time, an experimental amateur-built Van’s RV-7A, N1FB, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Gila Bend, Arizona. The pilot sustained minor injuries, and the passenger was not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. 

The pilot reported that about four minutes after departing Phoenix Goodyear Airport (GYR), Phoenix, Arizona, he leveled off at 4,400 ft msl and felt abnormal vibrations emanating from the engine. To troubleshoot the anomaly, he slowly enriched the mixture, and the engine continued to run rough. Additionally, he ensured that the fuel selector was in right fuel tank position and in the detent, the propeller control was full forward, and full throttle was applied, however, engine RPM appeared to be decreasing. The pilot stated that manipulation of the mixture control had no corresponding effect and he noticed that there was a lack of tension on the mixture control cable. He moved the throttle control about halfway toward idle, and the engine roughness slightly subsided, and engine appeared to lose total power. The pilot applied full throttle 
which produced a corresponding yet intermittent surge in engine power.

The pilot contacted Albuquerque Center, transmitted that he had an engine failure, and made a left turn toward Gila Bend Municipal Airport (E63), Gila Bend, Arizona. Unable to make it to E63, the pilot initiated a forced landing to a field with tall desert vegetation. During the landing, the airplane nosed over. Post-accident examination of the airplane revealed that the left wing sustained substantial damage.

The wreckage was recovered to a secure facility for further examination.

FMI: www.ntsb.gov

NTSB Prelim: Cessna 172

"...Pilot Transmitted “Mayday Mayday… Loss Of Control… 088 Cessna.”

Location: Cintrona, PR Accident Number: ERA25FA082
Date & Time: December 20, 2024, 14:00 Local Registration: N22088
Aircraft: Cessna 172 Injuries: 1 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

On December 20, 2024, about 1400 Atlantic standard time, a Cessna 172S, N22088, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Cintrona, Puerto Rico. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The airplane departed Fernando Luis Ribas Dominicci Airport (TJIG), San Juan, Puerto Rico, and the first ADS-B-derived track data showed that it was about 8 nautical miles (nm) southwest of the airport. The airplane continued to Antonio Rivera Rodríguez Airport (TJVQ), Isla de Vieques, Puerto Rico, where the pilot performed an approach consistent with a touch-and-go landing. The airplane then proceeded to Mercedita Airport (TJPS), Ponce, Puerto Rico where the pilot performed another touch-and-go landing before departing to the north. Shortly after departure from TJPS, a recording of the airport’s common traffic advisory frequency captured that the pilot transmitted “Mayday mayday… loss of control…088 Cessna.” This was followed by a final mayday transmission about 20 seconds later. The last ADS-B track data point was located about 2 nm northeast of the departure end of runway 12 at TJPS and about 0.3 nm northeast of the accident site.

The accident site was located in a mango orchard about 1.8 nautical miles (nm) from the departure end of runway 12 at TJPS. There was debris strewn along a path that was about 360 ft-long, oriented on a magnetic heading of 345°, and at an elevation of 46 ft mean sea level. The initial impact point was about 15 ft up a mango tree. The initial ground impact scar was about 140 ft from the tree impact and contained pieces of wheel fairing embedded in the scar. The main impact crater, which contained the propeller, was about 30 ft from the initial ground impact scar. The tree next to the main impact crater contained pieces of wing leading edge and about a 6-inch diameter branch was impact-separated. The left wing and the left door post were wrapped around a tree about 48 ft past the main impact crater. A branch about 1 ft in diameter was impact-separated, and the tree contained pieces of fuselage and cabin in the canopy. The right wing and engine were located about 75 ft past the left wing and the path was strewn with engine and airframe components. The fuselage and empennage were located about 70 ft past the right wing and engine. 

The cockpit and all instruments/avionics were destroyed. Both wings, the engine, both horizontal stabilizers, and the vertical stabilizer were impact-separated and found along the debris path. Rudder control continuity was established from the flight control horn to the rudder pedals through an impact separation, which displayed fracture features consistent with overload. Elevator control cable continuity was established from the flight control surface bellcrank to the cockpit bellcrank. The elevator trim tab actuator was measured and equated to 5° pitch up. Left and right aileron continuity were confirmed from the control surface bellcranks to the flight controls in the cockpit through multiple impact fractures consistent with overload separation. Aileron balance cable continuity was confirmed from the left aileron bellcrank to the right aileron bellcrank through an impact fracture consistent with overload separation. The overload fractures exhibited broomstraw appearance and unraveling of the control cable. The aileron control yoke chain and cable assembly cable was fractured just below the right yoke chain.

The engine was impact-separated from the fuselage and was found about 150 ft from the initial ground impact scar. The engine exhibited significant impact damage and the induction and exhaust systems were destroyed by impact forces. Both magnetos were impact-separated and found along the debris path; the impulse couplings snapped when the drive was rotated by hand. The ignition key was found in the both position. All major accessories, except for the engine-driven fuel pump were impact separated and found strewn throughout the debris path. 

The engine-driven fuel pump remained secure to the accessory case. The propeller was buried about 8 inches in the dirt at the main impact crater. The propeller blades exhibited S bending, leading edge polishing, and chordwise scratching.

The wreckage was retained for further examination. 

FMI: www.ntsb.gov

Today in History

33 Years ago today: On 20 January 1992 Air Inter flight 5148, an Airbus A320, struck a mountainside while on approach to Strasbourg-Entzheim Airport, France, killing 87 occupants; 9 survived the accident.

Date: Monday 20 January 1992

Time: 19:20

Type: Airbus A320-111

Owner/operator: Air Inter

Registration: F-GGED

MSN: 015

Year of manufacture: 1988

Total airframe hrs: 6316 hours

Cycles: 7194 flights

Engine model: CFMI CFM56-5A1

Fatalities: Fatalities: 87 / Occupants: 96

Other fatalities: 0

Aircraft damage: Destroyed, written off

Category: Accident

Location: 19,5 km SW of Strasbourg-Entzheim Airport (SXB) -   France

Phase: Approach

Nature: Passenger - Scheduled

Departure airport: Lyon Satolas Airfield (LYS/LFLL)

Destination airport: Strasbourg-Entzheim Airport (SXB/LFST)

Investigating agency: BEA

Confidence Rating:  Accident investigation report completed and information captured

Narrative:

Air Inter flight 5148, an Airbus A320, struck a mountainside while on approach to Strasbourg-Entzheim Airport, France, killing 87 occupants; 9 survived the accident.

Air Inter Flight 5148, an Airbus A320, took off from Lyon (LYS) at 18:20 on a domestic service to Strasbourg-Entzheim Airport (SXB). Following an uneventful flight the crew prepared for a descent and approach to Strasbourg. At first the crew asked for an ILS approach to runway 26 followed by a visual circuit to land on runway 05. This was not possible because of departing traffic from runway 26. The Strasbourg controllers then gave flight 148 radar guidance to ANDLO at 11DME from the Strasbourg VORTAC. Altitude over ANDLO was 5000 feet. After ANDLO the VOR/DME approach profile calls for a 5.5% slope (3.3deg angle of descent) to the Strasbourg VORTAC. While trying to program the angle of descent, "-3.3", into the Flight Control Unit (FCU) the crew did not notice that it was in HDG/V/S (heading/vertical speed) mode. In vertical speed mode "-3.3" means a descent rate of 3300 feet/min. In TRK/FPA (track/flight path angle) mode this would have meant a (correct) -3.3deg descent angle. A -3.3deg descent angle corresponds with an 800 feet/min rate of descent. The Vosges mountains near Strasbourg were in clouds above 2000 feet, with tops of the layer reaching about 6400 feet when flight 148 started descending from ANDLO. At about 3nm from ANDLO the aircraft struck trees and impacted a 2710 feet high ridge at the 2620 feet level near Mt. Saint-Odile. Because the aircraft was not GPWS-equipped, the crew were not warned.

THE MECHANISM OF THE ACCIDENT:

After analysing the accident mechanisms, the commission reach the following conclusions:

1 - The crew was late in modifying its approach strategy due to ambiguities in communication with air traffic control. They then let the controller guide them and relaxed their attention, particularly concerning their aircraft position awareness, and did not sufficiently anticipated preparing the aircraft configuration for landing.

2 - In this situation, and because the controller's radar guidance did not place the aircraft in a position which allowed the pilot flying to align it before ANDLO, the crew was faced with a sudden workload peak in making necessary lateral corrections, preparing the aircraft configuration and initiating the descent.

3 - The key event in the accident sequence was the start of aircraft descent at the distance required by the procedure but at an abnormally high vertical speed (3300 feet/min) instead of approx. 800 feet/min, and the crew failure to correct this abnormally high rate of descent.

4 - The investigation did not determined, with certainty, the reason for this excessively high rate of descent . Of all the possible explanations it examined, the commission selected the following as seen most worthy of wider investigation and further preventative actions:

4.1 - The rather probably assumptions of confusions in vertical modes (due either to the crew forgetting to change the trajectory reference or to incorrect execution of the change action) or of incorrect selection of the required value (for example, numerical value stipulated during briefing selected unintentionally) .

4.2 - The highly unlikely possibility of a FCU failure (failure of the mode selection button or corruption of the target value the pilot selected on the FCU ahead of its use by the auto-pilot computer).

5 - Regardless of which of these possibilities short-listed by the commission is considered, the accident was made possible by the crew's lack of noticing that the resulting vertical trajectory was incorrect, this being indicated, in particular, by a vertical speed approximately four times higher than the correct value, an abnormal nose-down attitude and an increase in speed along the trajectory .

6 - The commission attributes this lack of perception by the crew to the following factors, mentioned in an order which in no way indicates priority:

6.1 - Below-average crew performance characterised by a significant lack of cross-checks and checks on the outputs of actions delegated to automated systems. This lack is particularly obvious by the failure to make a number of the announcements required by the operating manual and a lack of the height/range check called for as part of a VOR DME approach.

6.2 - An ambiance in which there was only minimum communication between crew members;

6.3 - The ergonomics of the vertical trajectory monitoring parameters display, adequate for normal situations but providing insufficient warning to a crew trapped in an erroneous mental representation;

6.4 - A late change to the approach strategy caused by ambiguity in crew-ATC communication ;

6.5 - A relaxation of the crew's attention during radar guidance followed by an instantaneous peak workload which led them to concentrate on the horizontal position and the preparation of the aircraft configuration, delegating the vertical control entirely to the aircraft automatic systems;

6.6 - During the approach alignment phase, the focusing of both crew members attention on the horizontal navigation and their lack of monitoring of the auto-pilot controlled vertical trajectory ;

6.7 - The absence of a GPWS and an appropriate doctrine for its use, which deprived the crew of a last chance of being warned of the gravity of the situation.

7 - Moreover, notwithstanding the possibility of a FCU failure, the commission considers that the ergonomic design of the auto-pilot vertical modes controls could have contributed to the creation of the accident situation.